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Abstract 
It is believed that a microfinance program should be sufficient in developing 
countries. However， should it be sufficient in developed countries? This research is to 
examine the risk of mission drift of microfinance programs in developed countries with a 
case study of Comrnunity Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) in也eUK.
Under the reduction of CDFI support by UK government， CDFIs increased self-
su盟ciency.This study found that UK CDFIs experienced significant changes in terms of 
their target clients and business models. The reduction of government's support can cause 
the risk of mission drift. 
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1. Introduction 
The self-su血ciencyand sustainability of microfinance institutions (MFIs) have been 
one of quite popular topics of microfinance (Brau and W oller， 2004). 
It is generally believed由ata microfinance (hereafter abbreviated as MF) program 
should be financially sufficient (i.e. al of expenses are fully covered by earned income) in 
developing countries (Morduch， 2006) because reliance on grants and donations is not seen 
sustainable in a long term. Major microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Tier 1 and 2 attain 
sufficiency (Dieckmann， 2007). 
Mission drift refers to "釦 over-preoccupationwi出 profitabilityat出eexpense of 
poverty reduction and other development goals" (Copestake， 2007). Mission drift is often 
discussed based on MFIs that shifted from nonprofit organizations to for-profit companies. 
One of the symbolic case was the IPO (initial public offering) of Banco Compartamos in 
Mexico (Mersland and Strom， 2010). The idea of mission drift is usually recognized in the 
context of a simple tradeoff between profitability and poverty reduction in developing 
countries. 
However， should a MF program be su伍cientin developed countries? Servon (2002) 
noted MF programs have di:ferent characteristics in the US compared to their counterparts 
in developing countries. One of也echaracteristics is出atUS MF programs focus on business 
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support rather than just providing money. Business support is di盤c叫tto be fully covered by 
eamed income. In addition， US MF programs charge interest rates of microloans as low as 
8% on average (FIELD， 2013). Almost al of US MF programs are not su血cient--earned
income represents only 16% (FIELD， 2013). Especially public grant and tax credit have a 
major role of supporting MF programs. Therefore， unlike their counterparts in developing 
countries， US MF programs are not able to pursue profitability. Without public grant ahd tax 
credit， some MF programs might get to focus on clients of easier-to-reach: in other words， 
MF programs might ch叩 gethe depth of outreach and have a mission dr泣 tobe sustainable. 
MF programs have dual missions: financial sustainability and providing financial 
services to microenterprises (=enterprises with employees of ten or les) and low畑income
families (Mersland and Strom， 2010). Rhyne (1998) noted that MFI's profit motive leads them 
to be more e血dent，thus counteracting也edrift to beUer situated customers. Mission drift is 
taken to occur when an MF program leaves the poor customer segment (Woller et al.， 1999; 
W oler， 2002). 
2. Purpose and methods 
The purpose of出sresearch is to examine the risk of mission drift of MF programs 
in developed countries by focusing on a case study of Community Development Financial 
Institution (CDFI) sector in the UK. In the UK， MF programs are not clearly categorized as 
an independent sector and are included in the CDFI sector. 
US CDFIs and UK CDFIs share the idea of 'CDFI' (i.e.日nancialinstitutions wi出 a
mission of promoting financial inclusion) but也eyhave different characteristics. In the UK， 
after introducing CDFIs to promote financial inclusion in 2000， the government decreased 
support for CDFIs， while US government has heavily supported CDFIs for about 20 years. 
This study is based on the hypothesis that MF programs are likely to be affected by 
government po!icy， which can cause missionむift.
The author conducted in-depth interviews with managers of 12 UK CDFIs and 
government oficials in July 2013， and also collected references (see the Interviews List 
below). 
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[Interviews List] 
(1) North London Community Finance (NLCF): July 1st 2013 
(2) Big Issue Invest (BII)/ The Social Enterprise Fund (TSELF) July 2nd 2013 
(3) Grater London Enterprise (GLE) one London: July 2nd 2013 
(のThePrince's Trust London Regional 0血ce:July 3rd 2013 
(5) Community Development Finance Association (CDF A): July 3rd 2013 
(6) Capitalise Business Support: July 4th 2013 
(7) Aston Reinvestment Trust (ART): July 5th 2013 
(めFredericksFoundation: July 8th 2013 
(9) London Rebuilding Society (LRS): July 9th 2013 
(10) Black Country Reinvestment Society (BCRS): July 10也 2013
(1) Street UK: July 11th 2013 
(12) Start-Up Loans /Ministry of Business. Innovation and Skils (BIS) July 12出 2013
3. Overview of recent policies on financial inclusion and CDFls in the UK 
(1) Background of financial inclusion policies (1980s・1998)
Conservative Party's Thatcher Administration promoted financial deregulation 
to strengthen banking industry in 1980s. Banks closed many branches in deprived areas 
to reduce operational cost in 1980s and 1990s. As a result. people in deprived areas had 
di血cultyin accessing banks (Leyshon & Thrift. 1995). 
Labor Party's Blair Administration found 'social exclusion' as the major issue to 
address through its Third Way policies. Financial exclusion was recognized as one part of 
social exclusion. and many surveys were taken to make it clear the situation of financial 
exclusion after late 1990s. Kempson & Whyley (1999) estimated也at1.5 million households. 
which represent 7% of the whole UK. did not utilize any major types of financial services 
(such as bank accounts. savings. pensions and insurance). Moreover. about 20% of the whole 
households hardly used financial services. FSA (2000) analyzed the reasons why financial 
exclusion occurs. The reasons included inconvenient services for handicapped. inappropriate 
product design for people wi出 lowincome. and the lack of financialliteracy. 
The Blair Administration established Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) in Cabinet 0血ce
in 1997 and asked the unit to make policies to promote social inclusion. SEU submitted a 
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report in 1998 and created 18 PoIicy Action Teams (P A T) to provide important information 
for so批egytackling specific aspects of social exclusion. Among them， P A T 3 andP A T 14
were engaged in financial exclusion issues. 
(劫Financialinclusion poIicies for consumers (1999-2011) 
PA T 14 (financial services) submitted a report in 1999 with three major 
recommendations: (1) to promote credit unions to provide low-income people with financial 
services， (2)to utiIize rent insurance， and (3)加 utiIizebasic bank accounts through the post 
office network. The government took most of the PA T 14 recommendations (except rent 
insur組問)into the policies. Among them， the government amended the Credit Union Act in 
2002 so出atcredit山lIonscan raise external funds and strengthen their finance. 
The goveロunentlater focused on由eover-indebtedness issue and published a report 
titled "Promoting Financial Inclusions" in 2004， announcing the establishment of Financial 
Inclusion Fund (FIF) and provision of i:，120 million for the fund in three years. The fund 
budget included Growth Fund (i:，36 million) and face-to・facemoney advice (i:，45 million). 
Grow也 Fundwas the grant for credit unions and consumer loan community development 
financial institutions (CDFIs) (they are usually cal1ed "persona11oan CDFIs" in the UK). 
Personalloan CDFIs lend small amount of money wi由 lowinterest rates to low-income people， 
because low-income people are likely to borrow from loan sharks and struggle to pay back 
FIF provided i:，120 million of grant in出efirst出reeyears (2005-200町andthen i:，130 million 
of grant in出enext也reeyears (2009-2011). In addition，也egoveロunentfounded Financial 
Inclusion Taskforce in 2005. This taskforce aimed to improve access to financial services and 
to monitor the progress of financia1 inclusion policy. 
(3) Microenterprise development policies (1999-2006) 
P A T 3 (enterprise) submitted 24 recommendations in the report tit1ed "Enterprise 
and Social Exclusion" in 1999. The recommendations included that Small Business Service 
and Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) promote to create businesses in deprived areas 
and strengthen finance of CDFIs. 
On the other hand， Social Investrnent Task Force (SITF; 2000-2010) published five 
recommendations in 2000; (1) to establish task credit system to support CDFIs' fundraising， (2)
to found a community development venture capita1， (劫tomake banks disclose information on 
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how banks provided loans in deprived areas，性)to enable public-interest foundations to invest 
in CDFIs，血d(5) to found a national association of CDFIs and a fund available for CDFIs (Social 
InvestInent Task Force， 2000). 
Based on the recommendation by P A T 3， the Phoenix Fund was established in 
1999 to provide business CDFIs wi也 grants(CDFIs lending to small businesses are called 
"business CDFIs" in the UK). Also， based on出erecommendations by SITF， the tax credit 
system (Community Investment Tax Relief: CITR)， a venture capital (Bridges Community 
Ventures) and the national association of CDFIs (Community Development Finance 
Association: CDF A) were created in 2002. 
The government provided 60 business CDFIs wi出 thePhoenix Fund grants of ;842 
million during 2000-2006 to support development of CDFI sector in也eUK(A血eck，2011).
The government allocated the leftover of the Phoenix Fund (;8 11 million) to 9 Regional 
Development Agencies in the UK when the Phoenix Fund ended in 2006. The amount of由e
grant for business CDFIs greatly reduced (GHK Consulting， 2010; A血eck，2011).
The government allowed Certified CDFIs to join Small Firm Loan Guarantee 
Scheme (SFLG) in 2006 to mitigate the influence of grant reduction (Thiel & Nissan， 
2008). The government was to guarantee up to 75% of loans to small companies through 
SFLG. This loan guarantee system became a significant tool for CDFIs to continue risky 
microenterprise loans (GHK Consul出g，2010).
However， the government amended the SFLG scheme and introduced Enterprise 
Finance Guarantee (EFG) in 2009 in response to the global financial crisis. While EFG scheme 
covers broader range of companies than former SFLG， EFG has an annual cap of guarantee 
amount per a financial ins出ltion.A financial institution can request guarantee of write-off 
loans up to 13% of the total amount of loans. The introduction of the annual cap heavily held 
down risky.loans to microenterprises. Although the annual cap grew from 13% to 20% in 
2013， the cap is stil insufficient to fuly cover the risk of microenterprise loans (the interview 
with a staf member at CDF A). 
The leftover budget of the Phoenix .Fund was allocated to RDAs and the policy 
of promoting CDFIs was decentralized from the central government to the regional 
governments in 2006. Business CDFIs gradually built strategic partnerships with RDAs to 
raise funds. 
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(4) Disconnection from the Labor government (2006-2011) 
Due to the national election and the switch of the administration from the Labor 
p訂tyto the Conservative & Liberal Democratic coa1ition in 2010. socia1 exc1usion got out of 
the major political issue. Financial Inc1usion Taskforce was c10sed in March 2011 (Rowlingson 
& McKay. 2014). FIF ended in March 2012. Since the c10sure of FIF. there have been no 
public grants available for personalloan CDFIs and money advice organizations. 
Also.也eCameron administration decided ωcease RDAs in June 2010 and RDAs 
were al dissolved in March 2012. All of the public grants for business CDFIs have also 
gone. and some CDFIs had to stop their operations (the interview with a staf member at 
Fredericks Foundation). 
The Labor government started Local Enterprise Growth Initiative (LEGI) in 2006 
to promote small business creation in deprived areas by providing grant of f:418 mi山on.
Some CDFIs were able to support microenterprises using the LEGI grant. However. the 
government ended LEGI in March 2011. 
As government grants were diminishing and loan guarantee became less available 
in the late 2000s. business CDFIs sought other fund sources in European Union (EU). Some 
CDFIs applied for grant to European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The ERDF grant 
represented 55% of the total revenue of business CDFIs in 2012. ERDF grant awardees 
were 1紅 ge-sizedand established CDFIs出atafford a lot of paper works and have strong 
partnerships with local governments. 
(5) New policies of the coalition government (2011-present) 
The coalition government launched a new initiative tit1ed Regional Growth Fund 
(RGF) in 2011 aiming economic growth and sustainable employment. RGF is supposed to 
be operated from 2011 through 2016 with the total budget of f:260 million. RGF can be a 
grant direct to businesses or grants to support programs inc1uding" loan programs to small 
and middle-sized enterprises (SMEs) through intermediary organizations. With respect to 
business CDFIs.出enational association. CDFA. matched a fund of f:30 million grant from 
RGF with f: 30 million loan from private banks to be available for CDFIs. 
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Table 1. Policy changes of罰nancialinclusion in the UK， 1997・2012
For businesses For consumers 
1997 Labor party administration started a 
1999 P A T 3 report with recommendations PA T 14 report with 
The Phoenix Fund created recommendations 
2∞o Social Investment Task Force recommendations 
2002 Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR) introduced Credit Union Act 
Community Development Finance Association (CDF A) amended to deregulate 
founded credit unions 
2004 Report 
Financial Inclusions" 
Financial Inclusion 
Fund (FIF) created 
2005 Financial Incl usion 
Taskforce founded 
2∞6 The Phoenix Fund ended and was delegated into Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) 
Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme (SFLG) became 
available for CDFIs 
Local Enterprise Growth lnitiative (LEGI) started 
2∞8 The leftover of the Phoenix Fund ended 
2009 SFLG switched to Enterprise Finance Guarantee (EFG) to 
introduce the annual cap 
2010 Conservative & Liberal D~m∞ratic coalition administration started 
2011 Local Enterprise Growth lnitiative (LEGI) ended Financial Incl usion 
Regional Development Fund (RGF) started Taskforce closed 
New Enterprise Allowance (NEA) started 
2012 Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) closed FIF ended 
Local Economic Partnerships (LEPs) started 
Start-Up Loans (SUL) pilot started 
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The government started two other programs; New Enterprise Allowance (NEA) in 
2011 and Start-Up Loans (SUL) in 2012. 
NEA is to 1end up to <f.1，OOO to a new entrepreneur who used to be an unemp10yed 
for more出血 sixmonths (the amount was increased to <f.2，500泊 2013).Six CDFIs joined 
NEA program (CDF A. 2013). 
SUL was designed to 1end to young peop1e to support starting a small business. 
Originally Lord Young offered this program because young peop1e have difficu1ty in 
raising fund to start a business. The pi10t project of SUL program (from Sep. 2012 to May 
2013) targeted 18・24years olds， but it broadened the range to 18・30years old in J an.2013. 
Moreover， itcomp1etely eliminated the year range in Sep. 2013 so that midd1e or senior 
peop1e a1so can app1y for the program. 
So far， SUL program lent <f.108 million to 20，43 persons (at the iime of Oct. 23rd 
2014; http://www.startup10ans.co.uk/). Some CDFIs made a contract with Start-Up Loans 
Company and became a "De1ivery Partner" to 1end to microenterprises. The greatest 
advantage for Delivery Partners is no financia1 risk for write-offs， because the government 
guarantees 100% of write-offs and makes an agreed fixed contract contribution per 10an 
towards operationa1 expenses. The number of Delivery Partners has rapidly grown to 64 (at 
the time of Oct. 23rd 2014; http://www.st訂 tup10ans.co.ukI).
NEA and SUL programs widened the chances of risky microenterpri冊 10ansby 
100% government guarantee， there remain prob1ems of mora1 hazard and high write-off 
rates. 
On the other hand， persona110an CDFIs 10st their policy initiative and grant source; 
the government c10sed Financia1 Inc1usion Taskforce in March 2011， and ended Financia1 
Inc1usion Fund (FIF) in March 2012. The government has not initiated any other policies 
promoting financia1 inc1usion for consumers and supporting persona110an CDFIs. 
The UK government has in仕oduceda 10t of new policies and abandoned them in 
a short period since 1ate 1990s (Tab1e 1). There has been no 10ng-term consistent strategic 
approach to tack1e financia1 exc1usion. As each administration wants to abolish existing 
policies and to start its own policies， CDFIs were a1ways heavi1y affected by the often policy 
changes. 
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4. Findings 
(1) Overview of CDFI sector in the UK 
While the oldest Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) in the UK 
is The Prince's Trust (founded in 1983)， most of CDFIs were founded after 2000 because of 
financial inc1usion policy by Blair administration. With the government's supportive policies， 
the number of CDFIs (=members of CDF A) increased from 10 in 1993 to 80 in 2005. After 
the end of the Phoenix Fund in 2006， CDFIs gradually decreased to 53 in 2013 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Number of CDFls from 1993 
to 2011. 
Numberof仁DFlsin the UK， 1993-2011 
Source: CDFA， "Inside Community 
Finance: Annual Survey of CDFls in 
the UK"， June 2012， p.10. 
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Out of the total. business CDFI sub-sector represents the biggest percentage (70%) 
(Figure 2). Some CDFIs provide microfinance services: small-sized loans to microenterprises 
The average amount of these microloans is small. Personal loan CDFIs are 19% and they 
lend small amount of money to low-income people for general consumption. Some of them 
recognize themselves as microfinance. Although these CDFIs are not c1early categorized as 
“microfinance organizations"， microloan is supposed to be a small amount of loan less than 
.flO，OOO and small business loan ranges from .flO，OOO to .f50，OOO in the UK (Thiel. 2008) 1. 
1 The CEO of ART (Aston Reinvestment Trust) noted that the range of microloan has changed since the 
credit crunch in 208. According to him. microloan is currently under f:2，OOO (by his email， November 8th 
2014) 
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CD FI sub-sectors in the UK， 
2013 
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the UK， 2013. 
Source: CDFA， "Inside 
Community Finance: The 
CDFI Industry in the UK 2013"， 
February 2014， p.9. 
The total amount of public source for CDFIs decreased from E8 million in 2011 
to E5.6 million in 2013. As the public grants available for CDFIs decreasing， the number of 
CDFIs has also decreased from 80 in 2005 to 53 in 2013. CDFIs increasingly rely on earned 
income from D million in 2007 to E27 million in 2013 (Figure 3). As a result， 31% of CDFIs 
attained organizational self-suficiency in 2013. 
Percentage of earned income of CDFIs， 
2007-2013 
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Figure 3. Percentage of 
earned income of CDFls， 
2007-2013. 
Source: CDFA， "Inside 
Community Finance: The 
CDFI Industry in the UK 
2012"， March 2013， p.15. 
[Loans to microenterprises] 
The average loan size for microenterprises grew up as the public grants for CDFIs 
faded out. Larger loans are more profitable and CDFIs shifted from micro-sized to small-
sized loans， as the public grants faded out 
Interestingly， the average loan size sharply dropped from El3.734 in 2010 to E4，226 
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in 2013 (Fi即re4). The biggest factors to lower the average size are public grants including 
NEA and SUL. The maximum loan size for NEA is only f:1，000 (after raised to f:2，500)， and 
the average loan size of SUL is f:5，282. It is apparent出atmicroloan programs are subject to 
the government policies to support. 
「…LO-q7STARTIMICROLO込~NS (2004・2013)
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[Personalloan CDFIsl 
Figure 4. Average loan size 
of Start/ M icroloans from 
2004 to 2013. 
Source: CDFA， "Inside 
Community Finance: The 
CDFI Industry in the UK 
2013"， February 2014， 
p.19. 
As the government ended Financial Inclusion Fund (FIF)血 March2012， personal 
loan CDFIs' self-su血ciency(=percentage of earned income) rapidly increased from 38.3% in 
2011 to 75.7% in 2013. FIF was the major grant by the national government to personalloan 
CDFIs and had effect to lower interest rate (Department for W ork and Pensions (DWP) and 
local au出oritiescontinue to provide grants to these CDFIs). 
Personal loan CDFIs now have only small percentage of grant income and they釘e
strongly expected to be self-su血cientby increasing their own earned income. 
"Self-su伍cient"means that a CDFI can cover al of由eoperational costs by earned 
income and does not have to rely on grant income. These CDFIs had to increase their 
average APR (annual percentage rate) in order to become more self-su血cientin two years; 
from 31% in 20日 to69.9% in 2013 (Figure 5). Unlike microenterprise CDFIs， personalloan 
CDFIs have to heavily rely on interest fes. Although these CDFIs' average APR is lower 
白血也atof private money lenders (272%)， the negative impact of raising APR on consumers 
is obvious. 
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PERSONAL LOAN CDFIS: APRAND 
SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
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。)Case studies of CDFIs in response to也epolitical changes 
Figure 5. Personal loan CDFls: 
APR and self-sufficiency， 
2011-2013. 
Source: CDFA， "Inside 
Community Finance: The 
CDFI Industry in the UK 
2013"， February 2014， p.45. 
The author found that UK CDFIs have experienced significant changes in terms 
of their clients and business models in response to出eirincome change. Different types of 
changes are observed. 
-Some CDFIs sh出edtheir target clients from microenterprises to SMEs and raised average 
loan size. 
-A CDFI faded out from microenterprise loan and now focuses on home improvement. The 
CDFI stil serves socially disadvantaged clients. 
-A CDFI scaled microenterprise MF program by developing high net worth individual 
donors. 
-A personal-loan CDFI became self-sufficient by earning interest and fees after ceasing the 
public grant. The CDFI survives under competition wi出 paydaylenders. 
(2-a) CDFI which shifted from microloans to small business loans 
Aston Reinvestment Trust (ART) is a business CDFI in West Midland. ART was 
founded in Birmingham city in 1997 to vitalize underserved areas. Originally ART used to 
provide microloans ranging from f:2，OOO to ;f25，OOO) to microenterprises including immigrant 
business owners in deprived areas. ART raised its loan range to f:10，OOO-;f25，OOO (GHK 
Consul也19，2010， pp. 181-187). After ART raised the maximum amount to ;f50，OOO because 
of European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)， and to f:100.000 because ART joined 
Regional Growth Fund (RGF). Currently ART has the loan range of f:lO，OOO-f:lOO，OOO. ART 
mostly shifted from microloans to small business loans. 
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According to the CEO of ART， the reasons of shifting from microloans to small 
business loans are twofold; (1) to align wi出 publicgrants/loans and (2) to become more 
sustainable. 
ART is operationally self.剖血cient(i.e. al of the costs except loan los coverage are 
covered by the earned income). ART covers the operational cost by earned income (interest 
and fee incomes). ART's annual interest rate is currently 14% on average. 
The CEO recognizes the conflict between social mission and self-su宜iciency，but 
ART has to expand the maximum loan size to be more sustainable. 
ART stiU lends 70% to microenterprises (les than 10 employees)， and retains its 
original mission to provide access to finance for businesses and support the local economy 
through job creation and preservation. However， ART had to shift its original focus from 
microloans to small business loans in order to achieve self-su血ciency.
ローb)CDFI which changed its fi.eld from microfi.nance to home improvement 
London Rebuilding Society (LRS) was founded in 2000 and has changed its major 
fi.eld since inception. In early days， LRS mainly lent to social enterprises. However， due to the 
financial crisis in 2008， LRS customers struggled to pay也eirloans back: The key funders 
withdrew their fund from LRS， and LRS ceased social enterprise loans in 2011. 
The founder of LRS originally wanted to replicate group lending model of 
microfinance in the UK. She started the Mutual Aid Fund (MAF) project in 2005 to enable 
community groups to provide affordable small loans (actually the project had an individual 
lending model， not a group lending model). LRS's staff member trained group leaders 
and也enthe leaders did a micro丑nanceoperation for the participants of the groups. LRS 
provided the microfinance groups wi出 loancapital; up to oelO，OOO per a group. However， the 
performance of MAF program was not so great. One of the problems was也edi血cultyin 
monitoring performance of these small disparate groups. Another problem was high cost to 
operate出eproject. When LRS started MAF project. grant-aid foundations provided grants 
to support the project. It was hard to get another private grant to m瓜ntainMAF project 
again. Additionally， the consumer credit regulation was undergoing a major overhaul. and the 
new rules and fees would make it very di盟cultfor small organizations to obtain a consumer 
credit license. Finally LRS decided to stop MAF project. 
MAF project was the only microfi.nance model in the UK targe也19ethnic minorities 
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and immigrant workers. Although the exact statistics do not exist， a group typically provided 
12-15 loans from the loan capital of of5，000-oflQ，000. 
Instead， LRS has recently focused on another field: home improvement. LRS started 
a pilot project in 2005 to exar叫ne也eeffectiveness of reversion mortgage to improve houses 
of elder people living in deprived areas. After ending the grant-funded pilot project in 2012， 
LRS launched a commercial-based home improvement project in 2013. Therefore， LRS shぜted
its major field from microfinance to home improvement. 
(2-c) CDFI which continues to provide microloans 
Fredericks Foundation was founded in South East England in 2001 to help people 
start a small business. In the beginning Fredericks provided very small sized grants of 
of500-of1，500 to people wi由 loweducational attainment or low income. As由atkind of grants 
did not work， the founder switched the grants to small loans up to of5，000 to long-term 
unemployed people. 
Financial crisis in 2008 made microenterprises quite difficult in raising capital 
from banks. In response to出efinancial deadlock of small businesses， Fredericks raised the 
maximum amount of loans from of5，000 to of20，000 in 2008. 
Although Fredericks raised its maximum amount， it stil provides microloans to 
microenterprises; the average loan size is around of5，000 (Fredericks Foundation annual 
report 2013). In addition， Fredericks increased the number of microloans in recent ye訂 s;63 
loans in 2011， 85 loans in 2012 and over 200 loans in 2013. As other three microloan providers 
in South East England were closed or ceased operation after the year 2006.， itwas natural 
that microenterprises applied for a loan to Fredericks more白血ever.
According to CEO of Fredericks， one of the reasons that Fredericks can continue 
microloan service is that Fredericks raises donation from high net worth individuals who 
want to help entrepreneurs in their community. Private donation would become a risk buffer 
and can stabilize capitalization， as microloans have usually high default rates. Although 
Fr吋ericksjoins several public scheme such as SUL叩 dCITR， it is less likely to get affected 
by frequent changes of the govemment policies on microfinance. 
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(2-d) Personalloan CDFI which seeks self-su血ciency
Street(UK) was founded in West Midland in 2000. Street(UK) originally tried to 
replicate microfinance business model from developing countries and provided micro10ans 
to microenterprises. As the resu1t of Street(UK)'s micro10ans reached far from its prediction， 
it comp1ete1y changed its strategy in 2004. Street(UK) was divided into two organizations; 
one is Street UK. which mainly provides consumer loans in Birmingham and another one is 
Street NE. which provided micro10ans to enterprises in New Castle (Street NE was merged 
into Entrust in 2009). 
Street UK provides micro1oans to consumers ranging from .f200 to .f1.000 for the 
first time with APR of 95%. Street UK's APR is higher由anthe average of personal 10an 
CDFIs in 2013 (69.9%). It is because the first 10an has a high risk. Once a client successful1y 
pays出efirst 10an back. the APR of the second 10an wil be discounted to 85%. The APR of 
出ethird 10an: 75%. and出atof也efour出 andsubsequent 10ans: 65%. Most of the customers 
are 10w-income and the unemp1oyed; 80% of the customers receive their salary of .f1，500 or 
10wer. and 60% of them are unemp10yed at the time of June 2012. 
Street UK's write-off rate is usually between 8・12%(in 1ine with the average rate 
of 11% for personal 10an CDFIs in 2013). However， its consumer 10an business is not stil 
profitab1e. Street UK has to have other profitab1e businesses to cover the operational 10ss of 
personal 10an business. 
As Street UK does not re1y on any grant and is ful1y self-sufficient. interest and 
fee incomes are crucial to be sustainab1e. In addition， personalloan CDFIs are under severe 
competition among a 10t of for-profit money 1enders in出esame area. The CEO of Street 
UK recognizes the confiict between self-su白ciencyand its social mission. although Street UK 
makes efforts to provide loan products wi出 preferableconditions. 
5. Discussion 
Public grant is not the only factor to cause mission drift. MF programs can find 
other funding sources to supp1ement revenue， and can improve performance by cutting costs 
and minimizing default rates. However. public grants greatly a宜ectsustainability of MF 
programs and reduction of government's support c却 cause也erisk of mission drift. 
In fact. the average loan size of CDFI microloans changed in response to the policy 
一一TheRisk of Mission Drift of Microfinance: A Case Study of由eUK一一 65 
changes. After ending of the grant from Phoenix Fund in 2006. the loan size gradually 
increased. After launch of the project of New Enterprise Allowance (NEA) 2011 and St訂t-
Up Loans (SUL) in 2012， the loan size dramatically decreased. For personal loan CDFIs. 
after ending of the Financial Inclusion Fund in 2012. the average interest rate dramatically 
increased. 
This kind of change implies that the planning of public grant should be well-
considered to avoid mission drift and should have a long span vision to disseminate and 
stabilize MF system in the country. 
MF isseen to be risky and costly especially in developed countries. Unlike in 
developing countries. MF cannot be scalable and profitable; MF cannot apply group lending 
model and joint liability to overcome information asymmetry; MF has to weigh technical 
assistance (or business service) to serve socially disadvantaged people. That is why MF 
needs grant income to cover the cost. Without grant income. MF cannot be continue to 
provide microloan products with ，preferable conditions， or wi1 曲目tto more pro五tablezone 
(larger loan sizes or higher interest rates to serve well-off customers). In other words. MF 
may experience mission drift without grant income. In my case studies， ART decided to shift 
from microloans to small business loans to be more sustainable. ART raised the maximum 
loan size partly because it joined government grants for SMEs. Street UK charges high 
interest rates to be fuly self-sufficient. Frederick's case shows that grant has enabled to 
con出uemicr010an services. 
However. one could argue出atgrant may cause moral hazard of MFIs. If the grant 
covers any 10ss of microloans， a MFI wi1 provide inappropriate micr010ans. If a MFI part1y 
covers 10ss of micr010ans. MFI wil well-consider to make a decision to 1end in order to avoid 
unnecessary risk. If a MFI fully covers 10ss of micr010ans. MFIs wi1 hesitate to t北etoo 
much risk. 
The point is the balance between risk-taking and cost coverage among al of the 
stakeh01ders of MF. The au出orwould not insist出at由eful1 cost and risk of MF should 
be covered by pub1ic grant to avoid missionむift;instead. the cost and risk of MF should 
be sh町edby al1 of the stakeholders to avoid mission dr日1:.The best mix of the cost and 
risk in MF system can be p1anned in a country. The stakeholders include the government， 
grant-making foundations. financial institutions. investors. philanthropists. MFIs and their 
custome 
6 一一経 営 論 集一一
The policies on MF have frequently changed since late 1990s in the UK. While the 
goveロunentoriginally planned to develop CDFI sector. due to the frequent policy changes 
and patchy schemes. the number of CDFIs has decreased since 2005 and remaining CDFIs 
have struggled to survive. 
6. Conclusion 
Under the reduction of CDFI support by UK government. CDFIs increased self-
sufficiency. This study found that UK CDFIs experienced significant changes in terms of 
their target clients and business models. The reduction of government's support can cause 
the risk of mission drift 
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